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Disarmament Commission

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Agenda item 4

**Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

Working paper submitted by the United States of America

The United States offers the following recommendations for strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Most, but not all, relate to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive.

Non-proliferation and compliance

1. Member States currently not in compliance with their non-proliferation commitments under the NPT should make the strategic decision to come back into compliance.
2. NPT nuclear-weapon States parties should establish and enforce the controls necessary to ensure compliance with their article I undertakings, and continue to consult among themselves periodically in an effort to ensure the application of all necessary control measures.
3. NPT non-nuclear-weapon States parties should refrain from activities designed to develop a nuclear-weapons capability, adopt and enforce necessary national laws and regulations to comply with their NPT article II and article III undertakings, and provide transparency sufficient to demonstrate that their nuclear programmes conform to their non-proliferation obligations.
4. All NPT States parties should assess and enforce compliance with the Treaty's prohibitions on the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as on seeking or receiving any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, by non-nuclear-weapon States. NPT States parties should identify and stop all such violations as early as possible, well before these activities result in the actual manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
5. All States should maintain national moratoria on nuclear testing.

6. All States should continue to comply with, and support the extension of, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on strengthening export controls and nuclear material security. There should be continued cooperation in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through the provision of assistance where possible and needed. All States, as required by the resolution, should adopt national legal and regulatory measures, including enforcement provisions with appropriate penalties for violations. All NPT States parties should ensure that their national legal systems reflect both the broad goals of the NPT and the specific requirements of resolution 1540 (2004), and are adequate to ensure compliance by persons and entities within their jurisdiction.

7. All Member States should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, facilitating its early entry into force.

8. All States with the capacity to do so should pursue coordinated activities, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law, to interdict shipments, whether to or from States or non-State actors, of equipment, materials, and technology related to weapons of mass destruction that are inconsistent with the NPT's non-proliferation principles.

9. NPT States parties should address material violations of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations through appropriate means, including a halt to nuclear cooperation with the offending State party. The use of equipment or material acquired or produced as a result of a material violation of the NPT's non-proliferation obligations would cease, and the offending State party would be required to return or eliminate such items.

10. All States should support the activities of the Security Council when cases of nuclear proliferation, including non-compliance with articles I, II and III of the NPT, are brought to its attention. The Council should act promptly in such instances to determine a response, particularly when a case constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

11. All States should support the commencement by the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, without linkage to any other issue. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, all States should maintain national moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

International Atomic Energy Agency

12. All NPT States parties should comply strictly with their safeguards obligations, and actively assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in resolving questions or difficulties that arise in the application of safeguards.

13. NPT States parties should provide strong political and financial support for the rigorous implementation of IAEA safeguards, and provide to the IAEA credible information relevant to compliance with safeguards and obligations.

14. All NPT non-nuclear-weapon States that have not done so should bring into force, at the earliest possible date, the safeguards agreement required by article III.4 of the NPT, and thereby come into compliance with that Treaty obligation.

15. There should be universal adherence by all NPT States parties to the IAEA Additional Protocol, and agreement among them that implementation of the Additional Protocol is a key standard by which to measure a party's commitment to its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.
16. Adherence to the Additional Protocol also should constitute an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply.
17. All NPT States parties should endorse efforts to strengthen the ability of the IAEA to ensure that nations comply with safeguards agreements, including through the promotion of the work of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification of the IAEA Board of Governors.
18. Any State under investigation by the IAEA Board of Governors for unresolved safeguards violations should not be permitted to participate in decisions by the Board regarding its own case, while retaining the right to address the Board in connection with such an investigation.
19. All NPT States parties should cooperate with the IAEA at all times, including by granting any access requested by the IAEA, consistent with the relevant safeguards agreement, for purposes of facilitating confidence through enhanced transparency.
20. All States should assist IAEA efforts to obtain a full explanation of nuclear programmes being investigated for possible safeguards violations, to include NPT States parties acting immediately when called upon by the IAEA Board of Governors to provide additional information or access in such cases.
21. The construction of secret nuclear facilities by NPT non-nuclear-weapon States should constitute non-compliance with NPT article III. That non-compliance would be magnified by a lack of transparency, delay, or deception in providing information about these facilities once they are uncovered.
22. Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute requires a report to the Security Council on safeguards violations whenever the IAEA Board of Governors calls on a State to remedy any safeguards non-compliance that the Board finds to have occurred. Such a report also is appropriate whenever the Board finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or when questions arise that are within the competence of the Council because they pertain to the maintenance of international peace and security.
23. The IAEA should act swiftly, in conformity with its Statute, to halt technical assistance and seek the return of any related materials from any IAEA member that fails to remedy non-compliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement in a reasonable period of time.
24. The IAEA Board of Governors should suspend all technical assistance for any IAEA member State under investigation for such non-compliance and, for persistent violations of safeguards agreements, suspend its rights and privileges of membership, as permitted under the IAEA Statute.
25. NPT supplier States parties should undertake to deny enrichment and reprocessing equipment and related technologies to any State that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.

26. A reliable mechanism for providing nuclear fuel services at reasonable cost should be assured for all NPT States parties that are in compliance with the Treaty and with their safeguards obligations, which possess civil nuclear power reactors, and that do not pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

27. NPT supplier States parties should provide nuclear material, equipment, and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States only if all their peaceful nuclear activities are under IAEA safeguards and they are in full compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards. NPT States parties in compliance with the Treaty should receive preference over non-NPT parties in regard to assistance to their peaceful nuclear programmes.

28. Nuclear-related dual-use items are not to be transferred to any non-nuclear-weapon State for any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity, or to any State where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or if the transfers are contrary to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or when there is an unacceptable risk of nuclear terrorism.

29. All States should strengthen national nuclear export controls to prevent nuclear-related equipment, material, or technology from being diverted to terrorist States or non-State actors.

Peaceful nuclear programmes

30. Peaceful nuclear programmes pursued by NPT States parties must conform to their relevant obligations under articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.

31. NPT supplier States parties should facilitate the fullest possible cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by NPT compliant non-nuclear-weapon States, with due consideration for the needs of developing countries, and in ways consistent with the non-proliferation obligations and objectives of the Treaty.

32. Full compliance with the NPT's non-proliferation obligations is essential to sustain full international confidence in peaceful nuclear applications in energy, industry, health, agriculture, and other fields.

33. All States should condemn the activities of certain NPT States parties, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pursuing nuclear-weapons programmes under the cloak of allegedly peaceful nuclear programmes. The former should insist on the return of any previously supplied assistance to the nuclear programmes of the latter, and decline to provide any new assistance until those States parties come back into verified compliance with the NPT.

34. All States should undertake rigorous measures to address this security risk to the Treaty, especially that posed by tolerating the failure of member States to comply, and to maintain international confidence in peaceful nuclear cooperation among NPT States parties.

35. NPT article IV must be implemented in a manner that is fully consistent with the non-proliferation objectives and obligations of the Treaty.

36. The privilege to participate in peaceful nuclear cooperation and the benefits thereof should be reserved solely for NPT States parties that are in full compliance with their relevant obligations under articles I, II, and III.

37. NPT article IV does not provide States parties that have violated the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty any protection from the consequences of these violations, including the imposition of punitive measures against their nuclear programmes.
38. Non-compliance with NPT articles I, II, and III should lead, at a minimum, to a halt in nuclear cooperation with a non-compliant Party, whether bilaterally or through the IAEA.
39. NPT article IV does not require the transfer of any particular nuclear material, equipment, or technology, and NPT supplier States should not approve a transfer unless there is full satisfaction that the proposed transfer will not contribute to proliferation.
40. Nuclear export controls are fully consistent with NPT article IV implementation.
41. The NPT neither guarantees nor prohibits the acquisition of a particular nuclear fuel cycle facility, but any such facility should conform to, and be fully consistent with, the scale of the nuclear programme of the recipient State, as measured by international standards and economic factors.
42. An assessment of whether the pursuit of an allegedly peaceful nuclear programme conforms to the NPT's non-proliferation undertakings depends on a number of factors, including the degree of transparency, rigorous compliance with safeguards undertakings, and the programme's adherence to peaceful purposes.
43. Ample nuclear fuel cycle services will exist for the foreseeable future, so there is no near-term need for any NPT State party currently without full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing facilities to embark upon or complete the construction of such facilities. States should cooperate to ensure that reliable nuclear fuel services are made available to all countries that comply with their non-proliferation obligations and refrain from pursuing such facilities.
44. There should be an expansion of international partnerships, to include new donor and recipient States, in cooperative efforts, such as reducing global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium used in civil research reactors, and converting such reactors to the use of low enriched uranium where possible.
45. The international community should reduce the risk that terrorism poses to peaceful nuclear programmes by ensuring the application of strong security measures to nuclear material, radioactive sources, and associated facilities.
46. All States should undertake efforts to combat nuclear terrorism, such as implementing the IAEA's Nuclear Security Action Plan, supporting the revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and accelerating efforts to improve regulatory control of radioactive sources in more than 90 member States of the IAEA.
47. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is important for setting standards for the protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. All States should support efforts to strengthen the Convention and to increase the number of parties.

Conclusion

All NPT parties need to work to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. Every nation has a stake in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

The international security environment of the twenty-first century requires all Governments to confront the non-proliferation non-compliance challenges to the NPT. States parties should seek to strengthen the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty by responding decisively to non-compliance with these provisions, holding violators accountable for their violations, enforcing compliance with the Treaty, buttressing IAEA safeguards through adherence to the Additional Protocol, dealing with non-State actor trafficking in sensitive nuclear technology, blocking terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction by preventing cooperation between terrorists and their NPT violator patrons, and ensuring that activities to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy do not facilitate the illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology.

Should the Disarmament Commission adopt the foregoing recommendations, NPT States parties should promote their endorsement at the 2010 Review Conference.

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**Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic

The frequently noted danger of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes the complete elimination of such weapons imperative. To achieve this objective, it is important to consider adopting the following recommendations:

1. Nuclear-weapon States must, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, demonstrate genuine political will for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
2. Nuclear-weapon States must cease providing assistance to States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accordingly cease violating their commitments under the Treaty.
3. Nuclear-weapon States must refrain from placing limitations and obstacles in the way of the use by non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This would result in greater transparency in the activities of States and would facilitate the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
4. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be supported so that it is able to carry out its assigned tasks in the areas of non-proliferation and progress towards nuclear disarmament.
5. The principles of transparency in the activities of States, cooperation with IAEA and providing the necessary assistance to IAEA to carry out its assigned task must be firmly established.
6. Nuclear-weapon States must assume their responsibilities and strive for universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a necessary precondition for nuclear non-proliferation and for achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

7. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be reaffirmed as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
8. The 13 steps adopted by the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be adhered to and implemented in order to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament.
9. Due attention must be paid to implementing the Middle East resolution first adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and reaffirmed by the 2000 Review Conference.
10. The imposition of measures taken outside the multilateral framework must cease, as well as the treatment of nuclear proliferation issues according to an obvious double standard.
11. The Conference on Disarmament must be allowed to agree on an agenda that places nuclear disarmament at the top of its concerns.
12. Adequate impetus must be given to implementing nuclear disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and to activating United Nations disarmament mechanisms, including the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.
13. Attention and priority must be given to nuclear disarmament in regions of tension and conflict. Most prominent in this regard is focusing on Israeli nuclear weapons in the Middle East, which are developing in quality and quantity without any international control whatsoever. On the contrary, they receive aid and encouragement from certain nuclear-weapon States.
14. Israel must be called upon to submit all its nuclear facilities, activities and materials to the comprehensive IAEA inspection regime, to give up its nuclear weapons, and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State party.
15. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged as a step towards complete nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and towards reducing the danger of arms races in conflict zones. The Middle East is a prime example of such a zone, given Israel's possession of nuclear weapons outside the framework of any international control.

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**Recommendations for achieving the objective of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons**

Working paper submitted by China

The Chinese delegation hereby requests that the following elements be incorporated in the documents of Working Group I and the report of the Disarmament Commission.

I. Nuclear disarmament

1. A security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation should be pursued, so as to ensure common security for all and create a favourable regional and international environment for nuclear disarmament.
2. The international legal framework governing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation should be preserved and the predictability of the development in international security should be enhanced.
3. Adhering to multilateralism is the right path to maintaining and promoting international arms control and disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.
4. Efforts in nuclear disarmament, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are mutually complementary and reinforcing.
5. The goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be achieved at an early date and an international legal instrument thereupon should be concluded, thus realizing a world free of nuclear weapons.
6. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a downward balance. States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead

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in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding way.

7. Nuclear disarmament undertakings, including intermediate steps, should follow the guidelines of promoting global strategic balance and stability and undiminished security for all.

8. The missile defence programme should not affect global strategic balance and stability, or impair regional and international peace and stability.

9. Prevention of weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is conducive to maintaining global strategic balance and stability, and is in the interests of all countries. The Conference on Disarmament should negotiate and conclude relevant international legal instrument(s) as soon as possible so as to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and to promote the nuclear disarmament process.

10. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an important step in nuclear disarmament process, countries that have not done so should sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible so that it may enter into force at an early date according to its provisions, and the nuclear-weapon States should continue to observe their moratoriums on nuclear testing.

11. The Conference on Disarmament should reach a comprehensive and balanced programme of work so as to begin at an early date substantive work on important issues such as nuclear disarmament, banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances.

12. The following measures should be taken to promote nuclear disarmament, reduce the danger of nuclear war and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy:

(a) To abandon the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons;

(b) To honour their commitment not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries, nor to list any countries as targets of nuclear strike;

(c) To undertake that at any time or under any circumstances not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones; and to conclude relevant international legal instrument thereupon;

(d) Not to develop easy-to-use low-yield nuclear weapons;

(e) To withdraw and return home all the nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories;

(f) To abandon the policy and practice of "nuclear umbrella" and "nuclear sharing";

(g) To take all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.

II. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

1. Prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation is conducive to preserving regional and international peace and security. It is in the common interests and is a shared responsibility of the international community.
2. Prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation is also an effective and necessary step towards complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Efforts exerted by the international community to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation are an indispensable part of the international nuclear disarmament process.
3. Safeguarding and strengthening the authority and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime serves not only the long-term, but also the real and immediate security interests of all States.
4. Nuclear proliferation has complex root causes and should be addressed comprehensively. All States should devote themselves to building a global security environment of cooperation and mutual trust, developing a security perception based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and ensuring common security for all members of the international community; thereby removing motivations of States to acquire, develop or maintain nuclear weapons.
5. To achieve the goal of prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, States, as equal members of the international community, should promote dialogue and cooperation as well as develop and improve the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
6. Nuclear non-proliferation should be subject to and at the same time contribute to the improvement of international and regional peace and stability. Concerns related to proliferation of nuclear weapons should be addressed through political and diplomatic means within the framework of existing international laws. Relevant measures should be conducive to maintaining international and regional peace and stability, and should be conducive to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime rather than undermining it. Proper solutions should be sought through cooperation and dialogue rather than confrontation or coercion. Countries should not resort to wanton threat or use of force, and should not pursue other objectives under the pretext of non-proliferation.
7. Double standards on nuclear non-proliferation must be discarded. It is essential to ensure the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Efforts to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should follow the principle of multilateralism, and be carried out through broad consultations. Great importance should be attached and full play given to the role of the United Nations and other international organizations in these endeavours.
8. Nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are complementary to each other, and a balanced and harmonious relationship between the two should be established. While it is necessary to guarantee the legitimate rights of all countries to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes subject to full compliance with the non-proliferation goal, it is also necessary to prevent any country from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful utilization.

9. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is crucial to preserve the effectiveness and integrity of the Treaty. Both the nuclear-weapon States parties and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties should observe strictly and comprehensively, and implement in good faith their respective obligations. Principles governing nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy enshrined in the final documents of Treaty review conferences should be faithfully implemented to the letter.

10. Universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an important component of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. Countries that have not done so yet are urged to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible and place all their nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

11. The role of IAEA in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting the international cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy is irreplaceable. The IAEA safeguards is a significant means in preserving the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be promoted.

12. Measures should be taken to further strengthen nuclear export control regimes and to support efforts by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in this regard. Effective measures should be taken to guard against and counter nuclear terrorism, support IAEA efforts in preventing nuclear terrorism and promote the entry into force of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at an early date.

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**Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
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Working paper submitted by the Chairman

I. Introduction

1. At its 2006 session, the Disarmament Commission considered item 4 of its agenda, entitled "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", in the light of relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Member States identified the points set out below for further consideration in the course of the three-year cycle.

**II. General principles for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

2. Member States reaffirmed the following principles:

(a) The greatest threat to humanity derives from the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use. The threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and the rules of humanitarian law;

(b) The legitimacy of the demand for nuclear disarmament: the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(c) The quest for systematic and concerted action with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament should be pursued with renewed determination;

(d) The maintenance of global strategic stability and "undiminished security for all" is the basis of nuclear disarmament;

(e) Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are two closely interlinked aspects of that undertaking, and both serve the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

(f) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. All Member States should adhere to and comply fully with NPT efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, and measures for non-proliferation complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

(g) There is a close interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and regional security situations;

(h) In the current international climate, preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and security;

(i) Multilateralism is a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;

(j) The universality of existing multilateral treaties is indispensable for the efficiency of the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(k) The transparency and verification and irreversibility of all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control are cornerstone principles of the progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(l) After the end of the cold war, deterrence theory has lost its relevance. The prospect of an updating of strategic defence doctrines in a manner that sets out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation, is a matter of great concern for all States;

(m) The weaponization of outer space will affect the global strategic balance and will foster an arms race. Its prohibition is an urgent task for the United Nations disarmament machinery;

(n) Non-compliance cannot be handled through a selective, discriminatory and non-symmetrical approach;

(o) A nuclear threat to one State or region is a threat to all States and all regions — indeed, to all humanity;

(p) It should be reaffirmed that all States have the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in conformity with article IV of the Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system, which is a fundamental pillar for consolidating and enhancing the compliance and verification system for the non-proliferation regime.

II. Recommendations

1. Recommendations for nuclear disarmament

1.1. Nuclear disarmament

(a) Nuclear disarmament should be achieved through gradual reduction of nuclear stockpiles towards a balance at a lower level in order to maintain global strategic balance and "undiminished security for all";

(b) All States should pursue a balanced and non-selective implementation of the NPT and the strict implementation of, and commitment by all States parties to, the measures agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty;

(c) There is a need to negotiate a treaty to prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, as well as its military use;

(d) There is a need for an immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT);

(e) All States which have not yet done so should take necessary steps to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), especially the two remaining nuclear-weapon States whose ratification was a prerequisite for its entry into force. Concrete steps should be undertaken to motivate the States concerned to sign and ratify the Treaty. Pending such entry into force, moratoriums on nuclear testing or any other nuclear explosions declared should be observed by all States;

(f) All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to stopping the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, including those intended to be used in a scenario of conventional warfare;

(g) All nuclear-weapon States should take necessary steps towards the removal of the first-use posture from security doctrines and reach agreement on a legally binding international instrument on the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus reducing the risk of nuclear accidents and nuclear wars;

(h) Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established and nuclear-weapon States should make a commitment to withdraw their nuclear weapons from, and not to deploy them in, areas outside their national territories;

(i) The Moscow Treaty should be followed up by starting negotiations aimed at a succeeding treaty so that the number of nuclear weapons in the United States of America and the Russian Federation — as an intermediary step — could be counted in the hundreds and not in the thousands;

(j) An international conference should be convened at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

1.2. Security assurances

(a) Further discussions on security assurances should take place in the Disarmament Commission, where all United Nations Member States are represented;

(b) These discussions should be aimed at the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;

(c) The conclusion of such an instrument should be pursued as a matter of priority.

1.3. The role of the Conference on Disarmament

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should resume its substantive work and start negotiations on a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame with a view to concluding a legally binding international agreement on disarmament;

(b) The Conference on Disarmament should establish ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(c) The Conference on Disarmament should undertake to break its present stalemate and implement a structured agenda for negotiating an FMCT and a treaty for the prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, because it represents the most appropriate framework for negotiating such treaties.

1.4. Framework to achieve nuclear disarmament

(a) The disarmament machinery of the United Nations is the most appropriate framework for achieving nuclear disarmament;

(b) This machinery should integrate in its scope initiatives undertaken outside of the United Nations framework, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative taking into account the fact that ad hoc arrangements cannot be a substitute for steps agreed internationally with the full participation of all States;

(c) Each mechanism of this machinery should endeavour to perform its mandate efficiently and in synergy with other mechanisms;

(d) The Disarmament Commission should make recommendations to the Conference on Disarmament and to the General Assembly and should enhance its own efficiency by making use of the expertise of and scientific programmes on disarmament undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

2. Recommendations for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

2.1. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

(a) All States should act in such a manner as to safeguard and strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. The disarmament

machinery should address the current developments that might undermine the non-proliferation regime;

(b) All NPT States parties should take necessary measures to assess, in close cooperation with IAEA, and enforce compliance with the Treaty's prohibitions, and should identify and stop all violations as early as possible, well before they result in the actual manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon;

(c) IAEA should act swiftly to halt technical assistance to and seek the return of any related materials from any IAEA member State that fails to remedy non-compliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement in a reasonable period of time;

(d) Participants in the Nuclear Suppliers Group should provide nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States only if all of their peaceful nuclear activities are under IAEA safeguards and they are in full compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards;

(e) IAEA should be the sole authority to verify compliance with obligations under the Treaty. Its role should be strengthened. Implementation of the Additional Protocol should be considered a key standard by which to measure a party's commitment to its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT;

(f) All States should continue to comply with, support the extension of and cooperate for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), adopted on 28 April 2004, on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on strengthening export controls and nuclear material security;

(g) All efforts should be undertaken to eliminate the black market in nuclear material;

(h) All United Nations Member States should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, facilitating its early entry into force;

(i) NPT States parties should address material violations of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations through appropriate means, including a halt to nuclear cooperation with the offending State party. The role of the Security Council in case of non-compliance representing a threat to international peace and security should be strengthened in order that it can take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations;

(j) Proper solutions to nuclear proliferation threats should be sought through cooperation and dialogue and other political and diplomatic means and should be conducive to maintaining international and regional peace and stability and strengthening the non-proliferation regime rather than undermining it;

(k) States parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty;

(l) States parties to the NPT should consider holding the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007 in Vienna. The second session would then be held in Geneva and the third in New York, in order to contribute to a better operation of the NPT.

2.2. Nuclear testing

- (a) All States should become parties to the CTBT to ensure its universality and its efficiency and renounce nuclear testing;
- (b) All States should support the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization;
- (c) The Preparatory Commission should carry on with the establishment of its monitoring system.

2.3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- (a) Additional zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be established especially in the Middle East, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions;
- (b) Broad consultations should be undertaken to establish such zones;
- (c) The full participation of nuclear-weapon States is crucial for the effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2.4. Safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- (a) All States should take steps towards achieving universal accession to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and for the full implementation of article III of the NPT;
- (b) Measures should be taken to strengthen the implementation of article IV of the NPT, which guarantees the inalienable rights of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
- (c) Measures should be taken to promote cooperation in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological knowledge and information on peaceful uses of nuclear technology;
- (d) There is a need for IAEA to continue to pursue the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy, to put in place necessary safeguards and verification regimes and to monitor compliance with them in accordance with the provisions of the NPT.

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Disarmament Commission

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Agenda item 4

**Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

Working paper submitted by the Chairman

I. Introduction

1. At its 2006 session, the Disarmament Commission considered item 4 of its agenda, entitled "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", in the light of relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Member States identified the points set out below for further consideration in the course of the three-year cycle.

**II. General principles for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

2. Member States reaffirmed the following principles:

(a) The greatest threat to humanity derives from the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use. The threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and the rules of humanitarian law;

(b) The legitimacy of the demand for nuclear disarmament: the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(c) The quest for systematic and concerted action with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament should be pursued with renewed determination;

(d) Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are two closely interlinked aspects of that undertaking, and both serve the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons;



(e) Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are closely intertwined and reflect two sides of the same coin. Efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence-building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

(f) The maintenance of global strategic stability and of "undiminished security for all" is the basis of nuclear disarmament. It should be achieved through gradual and balanced reduction of nuclear stockpiles. The principle of universality of the treaties, the transparency and verification and irreversibility of nuclear arm stockpiles reduction and elimination are cornerstone principles of the progress in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(g) Measures to prevent nuclear proliferation in all its aspects, as well as the proliferation of other types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, reinforce efforts for nuclear disarmament and are important in providing a positive international security environment for the advancement of nuclear disarmament. Similarly, progress in nuclear disarmament reinforces non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, there is an interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and regional security situations;

(h) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. All States parties should adhere to and comply fully with NPT efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, and measures for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which complement each other should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

(i) There is a close interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and regional security situations;

(j) In the current international climate, preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and security;

(k) Multilateralism is a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;

(l) The universality of existing multilateral treaties is indispensable for the efficiency of the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(m) The transparency and verification and irreversibility of all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control are cornerstone principles of the progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(n) After the end of the cold war, deterrence theory has lost its relevance. The prospect of an updating of strategic defence doctrines in a manner that sets out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation is a matter of great concern for all States;

(o) The weaponization of outer space will affect the global strategic balance and will foster an arms race. Its prohibition is an urgent task for the United Nations disarmament machinery;

(p) Non-compliance cannot be handled through a selective, discriminatory and non-symmetrical approach;

(q) A nuclear threat to one State or region is a threat to all States and all regions — indeed, to all humanity;

(r) It should be reaffirmed that all States have the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in conformity with article IV of the Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system, which is a fundamental pillar for consolidating and enhancing the compliance and verification system for the non-proliferation regime.

III. Recommendations

1. Recommendations for nuclear disarmament

1.1. Nuclear disarmament

(a) Nuclear disarmament should be achieved through the gradual reduction of nuclear stockpiles towards a balance at a lower level in order to maintain global strategic balance and “undiminished security for all”;

(b) All States parties should pursue a balanced and non-selective implementation of the NPT and the strict implementation of, and commitment by all States parties to, the measures agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in particular the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty;

(c) The Outer Space Treaty and further efforts towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be kept in mind;

(d) There is a need for an immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT);

(e) All States which have not yet done so should take necessary steps to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), especially States listed in annex 2 whose ratification is a prerequisite for its entry into force. Concrete steps should be undertaken to motivate the States concerned to sign and ratify the Treaty. Pending such entry into force, moratoriums on nuclear testing or any other nuclear explosions declared should be observed by all States;

(f) All States possessing nuclear weapons should commit themselves to stopping the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, including those intended to be used in a scenario of conventional warfare;

(g) All States possessing nuclear weapons should take necessary steps towards the removal of the first-use posture from security doctrines and reach agreement on a legally binding international instrument on the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus reducing the risk of nuclear accidents and nuclear wars;

(h) Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established and nuclear-weapon States should make a commitment to withdraw their nuclear weapons from, and not to deploy them in, areas outside their national territories;

(i) The Moscow Treaty should be followed up by starting negotiations aimed at a succeeding treaty so that the number of nuclear weapons in the United States of America and the Russian Federation — as an intermediary step — could be counted in the hundreds and not in the thousands;

(j) An international conference should be convened at the earliest possible date with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame to eliminate all nuclear weapons, prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and provide for their destruction.

1.2. Security assurances

(a) Further discussions on security assurances should take place in the Disarmament Commission, where all United Nations Member States are represented;

(b) These discussions should be aimed at the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;

(c) The conclusion of such an instrument should be pursued as a matter of priority.

1.3. The role of the Conference on Disarmament

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should resume its substantive work and start negotiations on a programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame with a view to concluding a legally binding international agreement on disarmament;

(b) The Conference on Disarmament should establish ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

(c) The Conference on Disarmament should undertake to break its present stalemate and implement a structured agenda for negotiating an FMCT and a treaty for the prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space, because it represents the most appropriate framework for negotiating such treaties.

1.4. Framework to achieve nuclear disarmament

(a) The disarmament machinery of the United Nations is the most appropriate framework for achieving nuclear disarmament; the NPT is a cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts;

(b) This machinery should integrate in its scope initiatives undertaken outside of the United Nations framework, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, taking into account the fact that ad hoc arrangements cannot be a substitute for steps agreed internationally with the full participation of all States;

(c) Each mechanism of this machinery should endeavour to perform its mandate efficiently and in synergy with other mechanisms;

(d) The Disarmament Commission should make recommendations to the Conference on Disarmament and to the General Assembly and should enhance its own efficiency by making use of the expertise of and scientific programmes on disarmament undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

2. Recommendations for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

2.1. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

(a) All States should act in such a manner as to safeguard and strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. The disarmament machinery should address the current developments that might undermine the non-proliferation regime;

(b) All NPT States parties should take necessary measures to assess, in close cooperation with IAEA, and enforce compliance with the Treaty's prohibitions, and should identify and stop all violations as early as possible, well before they result in the actual manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon; [deletion requested]

(c) IAEA should act swiftly to halt technical assistance to and seek the return of any related materials from any IAEA member State that fails to remedy non-compliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement in a reasonable period of time; [deletion requested]

(d) Participants in the Nuclear Suppliers Group should provide nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States only if all of their peaceful nuclear activities are under IAEA safeguards and they are in full compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards;

(e) The role of IAEA should be strengthened. Implementation of the Additional Protocol should be considered a key standard by which to measure a party's commitment to its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT; [deletion requested]

(f) All States should continue to comply with, support the extension of and cooperate for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), adopted on 28 April 2004, on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on strengthening export controls and nuclear material security;

(g) All efforts should be undertaken to eliminate the black market in nuclear material;

(h) All United Nations Member States should sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and facilitate its early entry into force;

(i) NPT States parties should address material violations of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations through appropriate means, including a halt to nuclear cooperation with the offending State party. The role of the Security Council in case of non-compliance representing a threat to international peace and security should be strengthened in order that it can take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations;

(j) Proper solutions to nuclear proliferation threats should be sought through cooperation and dialogue and other political and diplomatic means and should be conducive to maintaining international and regional peace and stability and strengthening the non-proliferation regime rather than undermining it;

(k) States parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty.

2.2. Nuclear testing

(a) All States, in particular those listed in annex 2, should become parties to the CTBT to ensure its universality and its efficiency and renounce nuclear testing;

(b) All States should support the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization;

(c) The Preparatory Commission should carry on with the establishment of its monitoring system.

2.3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

(a) Existing zones free of nuclear weapons should be strengthened and additional zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be established especially in the Middle East, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions;

(b) Broad consultations should be undertaken to establish such zones;

(c) The full participation of nuclear-weapon States is crucial for the effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2.4. Safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy

(a) All States should take steps towards achieving universal accession to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and for the full implementation of article III of the NPT;

(b) Measures should be taken to strengthen the implementation of article IV of the NPT, which guarantees the inalienable rights of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;

(c) Measures should be taken to promote cooperation in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological knowledge and information on peaceful uses of nuclear technology;

(d) There is a need for IAEA to continue to pursue the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy, to put in place necessary safeguards and verification regimes and to monitor compliance with them in accordance with the provisions of the NPT.



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**Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

Working paper submitted by France

**Defining the current role of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation**

1. France reaffirms its commitment to the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It believes that there is no substitute for this Treaty in efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that no other tool can give the international community as high a level of security.
2. In recent years France has put forward many proposals to serve as inputs for international deliberations on ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. These proposals concern the effectiveness of the IAEA verification system; the role of the Security Council in dealing with proliferation cases as a forum of last resort; steps to hold States more accountable with regard to transfers of nuclear materials, especially the most sensitive materials; easier access to non-sensitive nuclear materials for States that honour their commitments; guarantees of access to nuclear-fuel-related services or to nuclear fuel itself; and the issue of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
3. France seeks to ensure that the debate on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime takes place in conditions in which the right to "nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", as recognized in article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is preserved and fully exercised by countries that strictly abide by their international obligations. France believes that nuclear energy can contribute significantly towards meeting energy needs and supporting sustainable development in the twenty-first century, particularly for countries with emerging economies.

4. In addition, France reaffirms its commitment to nuclear disarmament and to general and complete disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
5. Since the 1990s, a number of initiatives have been undertaken to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Some have succeeded, while others have not. New challenges have arisen. The international community is continually pondering new solutions for ensuring security for all without obstructing the exchanges of technology that are necessary for human development.
6. France is proposing the following areas of action to enable the United Nations Disarmament Commission to play its role to the full in the current round of deliberations.
7. With respect to the method, the Disarmament Commission should, over the next three years, work in the same constructive spirit that led, in 1999, to the preparation of the landmark report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
8. The Disarmament Commission could make an immediate and useful contribution to international deliberations by taking stock of the non-proliferation regime at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The Commission has the dual advantage, for the objective conduct of this analytical exercise, of being a forum for the development of ideas rather than decision-making, on the one hand, and of being genuinely multilateral, on the other. Together, the Commission members could focus on identifying the most effective measures taken in recent years, determining which measures have failed and recommending the decisions needed for the future development of the non-proliferation regime.
9. In particular, France encourages the Disarmament Commission to reflect on the best ways of promoting universal adherence to the existing regulatory framework, especially the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
10. Now that the end of the cold war has made it possible to move ahead in implementing article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Disarmament Commission could also discuss ways of putting an end to the nuclear arms race in those parts of the world where it is still taking place.
11. Lastly, as it has mentioned in the past, France believes that in-depth discussions on the issue of negative security assurances could, in the future, appropriately take place in a forum such as the Disarmament Commission, in which States not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are also represented.

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Elements of the French position on nuclear deterrence

Working paper submitted by the delegation of France

The French delegation wishes to inform the Disarmament Commission of the elements of its position on French nuclear deterrence policy as outlined in the recent statement by the President of the French Republic on 19 January 2006 at Ile Longue:

"For France, the creation of a national deterrent force was a real challenge that we were able to meet only thanks to commitment on everyone's part. It called for the mobilization of all forces, the development of our research capabilities and efforts to find innovative solutions to all kinds of technical problems. Nuclear deterrence thus became the very image of what our country is capable of producing when it has set itself a task and holds to it.

"I wish to pay tribute here to the researchers and engineers, from the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and all French companies, who enable us to remain at the forefront in vital sectors such as materials sciences, digital simulation, lasers — in particular the megajoule laser — and nuclear and space technologies. I would like to extend this tribute to all those who support our nuclear forces in one way or another: the staff of the Defence Ministry's General Delegation for Armaments (DGA), executives and workers in partner industrial companies and groups, the gendarmerie protecting nuclear facilities and personnel from all the services. I am of course thinking first and foremost of the crews of the maritime and airborne components, who carry out the longest and most important of the operational missions continuously and with the utmost discretion. I know that I have set a demanding requirement; but it is commensurate with our country's security requirements. I am aware of the constraints it imposes. You are seldom in the limelight, but I wish to pay tribute to your exceptional qualities and your very great merit. The permanence of the deterrent, which has been remarkably upheld for 40 years, itself serves as the highest praise.

"I wish to extend this tribute to your families, and more particularly those of submarine crews. I am very much aware of what operational patrols involve in terms of absence from home, solitude and sometimes suffering. You are conducting this mission in a constantly changing environment.

"It is true that, with the end of the cold war, we are currently under no direct threat from a major Power.

"But the end of the bipolar world has not done away with threats to peace. In many countries radical ideas are being spread which advocate confrontation between civilizations, cultures and religions. Today, this desire for confrontation translates into odious attacks which regularly remind us that fanaticism and intolerance are the source of all kinds of madness. Tomorrow, it may take even more serious forms, possibly involving States.

"Combating terrorism is one of our priorities. We have adopted numerous measures to address this danger. We will continue in this direction firmly and resolutely, but one should not yield to the temptation to restrict all defence and security-related consideration to this necessary fight against terrorism. The emergence of a new threat does not remove all the others.

"Our world is constantly changing and searching for new political, economic, demographic and military equilibria. It is characterized by the swift emergence of new poles of power. It is confronted with new sources of imbalance, in particular the sharing of raw materials, the distribution of natural resources, and changing demographic equilibria. These changes could result in instability, especially if they are accompanied by rising nationalisms.

"That the relationship between the different poles of power should sink into hostility in the near future is no foregone conclusion. To avert this danger, we must work towards establishing an international order based on the rule of law and collective security, on a fairer and more representative order. We must also urge all our major partners to opt for cooperation rather than confrontation. However, we are not safe from an unexpected upset in the international system, nor from a strategic surprise. All of our history teaches us this lesson.

"Our world is also marked by assertions of power based on the possession of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Hence the temptation for certain States to acquire nuclear capabilities, in breach of treaties. Tests of ballistic missiles with ever-greater range are on the increase worldwide. This led the United Nations Security Council to acknowledge that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constituted a real threat to peace and international security. Finally, the persistence of more traditional risks of regional instability should not be ignored. There are risks of this kind everywhere in the world, unfortunately.

"In the face of crises that are shaking the world, in the face of the new threats, France has always chosen the path of prevention first of all. Prevention remains in all its forms the very foundation of our defence policy. Relying on the rule of law, influence and solidarity, prevention is central to the set of actions conducted by our diplomacy, which constantly strives to resolve crises that may arise here and there. Prevention also involves a whole range of

defence and security postures, foremost among which are pre-positioned forces.

"But believing that prevention alone is enough to protect us would be naively optimistic. To make ourselves heard, we must also be capable of using force when necessary. We must therefore have a substantial capability to intervene outside our borders, with conventional means, in order to support and supplement this strategy.

"Such a defence policy rests on the certainty that, whatever happens, our vital interests will remain safeguarded.

"This is the role assigned to nuclear deterrence, which directly stems from our prevention strategy and constitutes its ultimate expression. In the face of the concerns of the present and the uncertainties of the future, nuclear deterrence remains the fundamental guarantee of our security. Wherever the pressure may come from, it also enables us to be in control of our actions, our policies, the durability of our democratic values.

"At the same time, we continue to support international efforts to promote general and complete disarmament and, in particular, the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. But we can of course progress along the road to disarmament only if the conditions for our global security are maintained and if the will to make headway is shared unanimously.

"It is in this spirit that France has maintained its deterrent forces, while reducing them, in accordance with the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the principle of strict sufficiency.

"It is the responsibility of the head of State to continuously assess the limits of our vital interests. Maintaining uncertainty as to these limits is consubstantial with the doctrine of deterrence. The integrity of our territory, the protection of our population, the free exercise of our sovereignty will always be the core of our vital interests. But our interests are not limited to these elements. The perception of these interests is changing as the world changes, a world marked by the growing interdependence of European countries and also by the impact of globalization. For example, safeguarding our strategic supplies or the defence of our allies are among the interests that must be protected. Assessing the scale and potential consequences of an unacceptable act of aggression, threat or blackmail perpetrated against these interests is the responsibility of the President of the Republic. This analysis could, in some cases, lead to a judgement that these situations fall within the scope of our vital interests. As I emphasized immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001, nuclear deterrence is not intended to deter fanatical terrorists. Yet the leaders of States who contemplate terrorist attacks against us, as well as those who might consider using weapons of mass destruction in one way or another, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and appropriate response on our part. And this response could be a conventional one. It could also be of another kind.

"From the beginning, both the spirit of deterrence and the means available have continuously adapted themselves to our environment and to the threat analysis to which I have just referred. We are in a position to inflict damage of any kind on any major Power that sought to attack interests we

would regard as vital. Against a regional Power, our choice would not be between inaction and annihilation. The flexibility and responsiveness of our strategic forces would enable us to respond directly against its centres of power and its capacity to act. All our nuclear forces have been configured accordingly. It is for this purpose, for example, that the number of nuclear warheads on some of the missiles in our submarines has been reduced.

"However, our approach to the use of nuclear weapons remains unchanged. There is no question, under any circumstances, of using nuclear means for military purposes during a conflict. It is in the spirit that the nuclear forces are sometimes referred to as "weapons of non-use". This formula should not, however, allow any doubts to persist about our determination and capacity to resort to our nuclear weapons. The credible threat of their utilization permanently hangs over those leaders who harbour hostile intentions against us. It is essential for making them see reason, making them aware of the disproportionate cost their actions would entail for themselves and their States. It goes without saying that we always reserve the right to resort to a final warning to mark our determination to safeguard our vital interests.

"Thus the principles underlying our doctrine of deterrence remain unchanged. But the manner in which it is expressed has evolved and continues to evolve, so as to enable us to address the context of the twenty-first century.

"The capabilities of the maritime and airborne components, constantly adapted to their new missions, enable us to match a coherent response to our concerns. Thanks to these two components, which are distinct but complement one another, the head of State has a wide range of options which over all identified threats.

"Modernizing and adapting these capabilities is thus absolutely necessary. Our deterrent must retain its indispensable credibility in an evolving geographical environment.

"It would be irresponsible to imagine that maintaining our arsenal in its current state might, after all, be sufficient. How credible would our deterrent be if it did not allow us to respond to new situations? What credibility would it have vis-à-vis regional Powers if we strictly confined ourselves to threatening total destruction? What credibility would ballistic weapons with limited range have in the future? The M51 ballistic missile, for example, thanks to its intercontinental range, and the improved air-to-ground medium-range missile system (ASMPA), will, in a volatile world, give us the means to cover threats wherever they arise and whatever their nature. Likewise, no one can contend that missile defence is sufficient to counter the threat of ballistic missiles. No defensive system, however sophisticated, can be 100 per cent effective. We can never be assured that it cannot be circumvented. Basing all our defence on this capability alone would in actual fact prompt our adversaries to find other means to use their nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Consequently, such a tool cannot be considered a substitute for deterrence. But it can supplement deterrence by reducing our vulnerabilities. This is why France has resolutely embarked on a joint review process within the Atlantic Alliance, and is developing its own programme for the self-protection of deployed forces.

"Our country's security and independence come at a price. Forty years ago, the Defence Ministry devoted 50 per cent of its investment to nuclear forces. This share has since been steadily reduced, and is expected to account for no more than 18 per cent of investment in 2008. Today, in accordance with its trademark spirit of strict sufficiency, our deterrence policy accounts overall for less than 10 per cent of the total defence budget. Defence appropriations dedicated to deterrence go to leading-edge technologies and provide extensive and key support for our country's scientific, technological and industrial research efforts.

"Ten per cent of our defence effort is a fair and sufficient price to pay to provide our country with a credible and sustainable assurance of security. And I assure you that calling this into question would be utterly irresponsible.

"Moreover, the development of the European Security and Defence Policy, the growing interweaving of the interests of European Union countries and the solidarity that now exists between them make the French nuclear deterrent, by its very existence, an indispensable element in the security of the European continent. In 1995, France put forward the ambitious idea of concerted deterrence in order to launch a debate at European level on this issue. I still believe that, when the time comes, we shall have to raise the question of a common defence that would take account of existing deterrent forces, with a view to a strong Europe which assumes responsibility for its own security. Indeed, the countries of the Union have begun to reflect together on what are, or will be, their common security interests. And I would like this process to become more far-reaching. This is a first and necessary step.

"Since 1964, France has had an autonomous nuclear deterrent. The lessons of history led General de Gaulle to make this crucial choice. Throughout these years, the French nuclear forces have ensured our country's defence and greatly helped to keep the peace. Today, they remain silently watchful, so that we can live in a land of freedom which is master of its future and its destiny. They continue, and will continue, to be the ultimate guarantor of our security.

"In my capacity as head of the armed forces, and on behalf of the French people, I would like to express the nation's appreciation and gratitude to all the women and men who contribute to this essential mission."

The French delegation wished to communicate these elements to the Disarmament Commission, thereby enabling its members to be fully and specifically informed of them.